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beyond the limit set by the Canneltoncase. But the phrase may mean only that
the taxpayer may include in his depletion base certain processes which are
supplemental to the listed processes, but which are not further along toward
the end product. This interpretation would not permit expansion of the depletion base. Unless the courts give the new phrase the latter, restrictive interpretation, the Commissioner may find his efforts frustrated. The struggle is not
yet over.

SECURED LENDING AND SECTON 60(a) OF THE BANKRUPTCY
ACT: THE NEED FOR A UNIFORM TEST OF PERFECTION
In any appraisal of transactions giving rise to security interests in personal
property, two fundamental elements must be considered. First, the device
used must confer upon the secured creditor a priority interest in certain property against the risk of the debtor's insolvency or bankruptcy. Second, it
must provide notice of the existence of the security interest to general creditors,
either through transfer of possession of the collateral to the secured party
or by some other feasible means.
Existing security devices, looked at against the background of the Bankruptcy Act, and particularly section 60 of that act,1 are fulfilling neither
of these aims effectively. Using accounts receivable financing as an example,
this comment will discuss some typical problems that arise, and it will suggest
that the most effective solution to the problem would be federal legislation
in the form of an amendment to the Bankruptcy Act.
To understand the problems in this area it is essential to have some appreciation of the haphazard character of the growth of the various security devices,
which has resulted in differences among them in rules, formalities, and requirements for perfection. 2 The oldest security device, dating back at least to
Roman law, is the pledge. The essential element of a pledge is possession by
the lender to secure payment of the obligation. Three currently used devices
which represent a development of the pledge concept are the security interest
of the carrier or warehouseman obtained by possession of a bill of lading
or warehouse receipt; the pledge of stock certificates, bonds or debentures;
and the field warehousing device.
But in many situations it is not possible or convenient to transfer possession
of the collateral to the secured party so as to create a valid pledge. The
chattel mortgage was developed to meet this situation. Naturally, where
possession of the property remained with the debtor, some other means
1 30 Stat. 562 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1958).

2 The brief discussion in the text ofthe history of security devices is adapted from Gilmore
& Axelrod, Chattel Security: I, 57 YALE L.J. 517 (1948), and Gilmore, ChattelSecurity: II,

57 YrB L.J. 761 (1948).
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was required to give notice of the security interest to competing creditors.
A system of recording was developed to meet this need. Because of the considerable history of the chattel mortgage, and the fact that it was adapted from
the much older real estate mortagage, its execution requires a number of
formalities and quite specific identification of the mortgaged property. In cases
where property is difficult or impossible to identify, as, for example, goods
in the manufacturing process, the chattel mortgage is of little use. The conditional sale contract was developed after the chattel mortgage to secure to
the seller the unpaid purchase price of goods. It too must meet rigid formal
requirements in many states and in some states it must be recorded. 3
The trust receipt was developed at common law in about 1880. It was
designed to give a security interest of relatively short duration while goods
were actively moving through channels of trade. The Uniform Trusts Receipts
Act, adopted by many states in the 1930's, provided for a new type of filing
which involved a simple statement specifying the name of the secured party,
the name of the debtor, and the type of property covered. More recently,
"factors' lien" acts4 have been enacted to confer a security interest in raw
materials and goods in process, and in the resulting accounts, upon the
filing of a statement similar to that used for trust receipts.
Finally, in the last thirty years, financing by loans on the security of
accounts receivable has developed. This device will be used in this comment
to illustrate the problem of secured lenders in attempting to perfect their
security against a trustee in bankruptcy, and the problem of protecting the
interests of general creditors against secret liens. Both of these problems are
present to varying degrees in all types of security devices, but because of the
arbitrary nature of the present distinctions in rules and formalities for the
various devices, results in the bankruptcy situation may depend on which
device is used.
Accounts receivable financing, 5 in the relatively short time it has been
used as a security device, has grown rapidly into a business involving many
billions of dollars annually. 6 The practicality of using accounts receivable
3 Cf. U orrORM
CONDrIONAL SALES Acr.
4 See, e.g., NEw YoRK PEPs. PROP. LAW § 45.
5
Accounts receivable financing, as used in this comment, means borrowing against

book accounts arising in the ordinary course of the borrower's business by pledging or selling
them. The normal use of accounts receivable is to finance the mercantile sale from wholesaler
to retailer. Accounts receivable are considered to be good security because, unlike inventory,

they are free of the hazards of merchandising and are subject only to the risk of collection.
In addition, the lender has something that resembles two-name paper, with both the borrower and the account debtor liable to him. For a general discussion, see SAuLN1ER & JACOBY,
AccouNTs RECEIVABLE FINANCING (1943).

6 Kripke, Address Before the Association of the Bar of the City of New York, April
14, 1952. At the end of 1945 the total outstanding consumer installment credit held by financial institutions was $1,776,000,000; at the end of 1959 the amount was $34,003,000,000.
FEDERAL REsERvE BULLETIN, March, 1960.
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as security and thereby maximizing the use of the assets of a business
was quickly recognized in the commercial world when, after the depression
of the 1930's, lenders were no longer satisfied with just a surety.7 But the
new type of transaction, involving secret assignment of accounts, proved
particularly susceptible to fraud, thus posing a difficult problem for courts
and legislatures. 8
An assignment of accounts as security is specifically enforceable in equity,
resulting in an equitable lien against the debtor's assets. Before the Chandler
Act9 was passed, a creditor with such a lien could realize his claim against
the assigned accounts ahead of all other creditors.10 General creditors had
little if any notice of this disposition of assets of the debtor since the equitable
lien was not a device subject to recording acts and there was no change of
possession as in the case of a pledge. Thus a sharp conflict in policy arose
between protection of unsecured creditors against secret liens and the enforcement of the security rights of lenders holding unpublicized assignments. A
review of the legislation dealing with this problem since the Chandler Act,
which virtually abolished all secret liens, demonstrates that neither of the
underlying policies is being effectively implemented. This comment will
suggest that, in view of the hazards of business fluctuations and ordinary

notions of fairness, it is difficult to defend specifically enforceable liens resulting from unpublicized security arrangements.
7 Open accounts were not assignable at common law. Anderson v. Lewis & Co., 10 Ark.
304 (1850). Early obstacles to the assignment of contract rights included the difficulty of
seeing intangibles handed over, the idea that champerty promoted litigation, and the
fact that contracts once had a personal aspect-the "hard" creditor and debtor's prison.
Accounts could be assigned in equity, however, to vest a beneficial interest in the assignee.
Hofferberth v. Duckett, 175 App. Div. 480, 162 N.Y. Supp. 167 (1916).
8 Various explanations have been advanced for the borrowers' insistence on secrecy.
Compare Kripke, supranote6("Receivables financing is still a relatively new form of business arrangement and some opprobrium is still deemed to be attached to it in some
circles, and some persons do not want it known that they resort to that kind of financing")
with Corn Exch. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434, 439-41 (1942): "Receivables often are assigned only when credit in a similar amount is unavailable through
other channels. Interest and other charges are high, and an assignment often is correctly
understood as a symptom of financial distress. The borrower does not wish his customers
to learn of his borrowing arrangement for the reason, among others, that customers, particularly in placing orders for future delivery, prefer to rely on solvent suppliers. And
often the borrower desires to conceal the fact that he is being financed by this method, lest
knowledge lead to a withdrawal of further credit or a refusal of new credit. The borrower
and the lender on assigned accounts receivable thus have a mutual interest in not making
the transaction known.... Secrecy has the effect of inducing others to go along with the
borrower in ignorance, where they would not do so if informed."
9 52 Stat. 869 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (1946).
10Unless an assignment is subject to attack under the rules of fraudulent conveyances
or unless there has been a failure to comply with applicable recording acts designed for the
protection of creditors, an assignee under a valid assignment generally takes priority over
subsequent creditors of the assignor who had no lien on the subject matter of the assignment
at the time when it was made. In re Hawley Down-Draft Furnace Co., 238 Fed. 122 (3d
Cir. 1916).
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The Chandler Act amendment to the Bankruptcy Act" was passed in
1938. One of its major purposes was the striking down of secret liens in
order to secure equal distribution among creditors of the same class.12
The act went far to abolish the equities of persons who had taken assignments
of simple contract rights as security for loans. The old act, 13 in section
60(a), had defined a preference as a transfer of property by an insolvent debtor
for an antecedent debt, thereby enabling a creditor to recover a greater
percentage of his debt than could other creditors of the same class. The
trustee was given power under section 60(b) to avoid any such transfer made
within four months of bankruptcy if the creditor had reasonable cause to
believe that it was a preference. However, up to the time of the Chandler
Act, there had been no clear indication of when a transfer would be deemed
to have been made. For example, a mortgagee who withheld his interest
from the record until the eve of bankruptcy might still escape the preference
section if the mortgage itself was executed before the four month period began
to run. Meanwhile, of course, third parties might have been misled by the
apparently sound credit of the mortgagor. t 4 The Chandler Act provided
an effective test of perfection. Under that amendment, a transfer was deemed
made at the time when it became "so far perfected that no bona-fide purchaser
from the debtor and no creditor could thereafter have acquired any rights
in the property so transferred superior to the rights of the transferee therein."' 5
In other words, the trustee in bankruptcy was accorded the rights of a hypothetical bona fide purchaser or creditor.
Interpreting the Chandler Act, the Supreme Court in Corn Exchange
Nat'l Bank v. Klauder'6 held that transfers not perfected under state law
against a bona fide purchaser were deemed to have been made immediately
prior to bankruptcy and hence constituted preferences voidable by the
trustee. 17 In that case, the lender had failed to notify the account debtors
of the assignment as required by Pennsylvania law and had thus lost his
security interest.
Since determination of what constitutes a perfected transfer depends
on state law,18 the effect of the Chandler Act on security devices can be
1152 Stat. 869 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (1946).
12 See H.R. REP. No. 1409, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 30 (1938).
13 30 Stat. 562 (1898).
14 See Friedman, The Bankruptcy PreferenceChallenge to After-AcquiredProperty Clauses
Under the Code, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 194, 201 (1959).
15 52 Stat. 869 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (1946).
16 318 U.S. 434 (1943).
17 At common law the debtor had the right to prefer one or more of his creditors over
another. Siegel v. Liberty Say. Bank, 272111. App. 43 (1933). This right has been virtually
nullified by statutes, including the Bankruptcy Act.
18 3 COLLImR, BANKRUPTcY § 60.48 (14th ed. 1941).
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understood only by examining the common law of the states as it stood in
1938 with regard to the perfection of an assignment against a bona fide
purchaser from the same assignor. There were ten states which followed
the so-called English rule of notification.19 In these states, as between
successive assignees of contract rights, the one who first notified the account
debtor was protected against the bona fide purchaser. The so-called American
rule which holds that an assignment is binding when made, no notification
being necessary, was followed in eleven states 20 but there were certain equitable
exceptions to this rule which came to be known as the Massachusetts rule 2'
or the "four horsemen." Under the Massachusetts rule, the first assignee
prevails unless the second assignee is a bona fide purchaser for value and is
first to obtain (1) payment or satisfaction, (2) a judgment, (3) a novation,
or (4) a tangible token or writing the surrender of which is required to enforce
the obligation. 22 In the American rule states there was always the danger that
courts would invoke the Massachusetts rule as a set of exceptions, and
that, as a result, the lender's security would become vulnerable to attack
by the trustee in bankruptcy under the Chandler Act. In other jurisdictions
the law was uncertain. Under the Chandler Act test, then, a non-notifying
assignee could be assured of prevailing against a subsequent bona fide purchaser only in the eleven American rule states-with the danger that even
there the "four horsemen" rule might be applied. 23
19 California, Connecticut, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, Mississippi, Oklahoma.
Pennsylvania, Tennessee and Vermont. See Graham Paper Co. v. Pembroke, 124 Cal,
117, 56 Pac. 627 (1899); City Bank of New Haven v. Thorp, 79 Conn. 194, 64 At. 205
(1906); Geisenberger v. Cotton, 116 La. 651, 40 So. 929 (1906); Lambert v. Morgan, 110
Md. 1, 72 Atl. 407 (1909); Klebba v. Struempf, 224 Mo. App. 193, 23 S.W.2d 205 (1930);
Mathews v. Hamblin, 28 Miss. 611 (1855); Jack v. Nat'1 Bank, 17 Okla. 430, 89 Pac.
219 (1906); In re Phillips' Estate, 205 Pa. 515, 525, 55 Atl. 213, 216 (1903); Clodfelter v.
Cox, 33 Tenn. (1 Sneed) 330 (1853); Nichols v. Hooper, 61 Vt. 295, 17 AtI. 134 (1889).
20 Arkansas, Iowa, Kentucky, New Jersey, New York, Oregon, Texas, Washington,
West Virginia, Minnesota and South Carolina. See Moore & Moore v. Robinson, 35 Ark.
293 (1880); Ottumwa Boiler Works v. M. J. O'Meara & Son, 206 Iowa 577, 218 N.W.
920 (1928); Columbia Fin. and Trust Co. v. First Nat' Bank, 116 Ky. 364, 76 S.W. 156
(1903); Moorestown Trust Co. v. Buzby, 109 N.J. Eq. 409,157 At. 663 (Ch. 1931); Superior
Brassiere Co. v. Zimetbaum, 214 App. Div. 525, 212 N.Y. Supp. 473 (1925); Meier v. Hess,
23 Ore. 599, 32 Pac. 755 (1893); Employers' Cas. Co. v. Rockwall County, 120 Tex. 441,
35 S.W.2d 690 (1931); Bellingham Bay Boom Co. v. Brisbois, 14 Wash. 173, 44 Pac. 153
(1896); Clarke v. Hogeman, 13 W. Va. 718 (1878); Burton v. Gage, 85 Minn. 355, 88 N.W
997 (1902); National Loan & Exch. Bank v. Gustafson, 157 S.C. 221,154 S.E. 167 (1930).
But note that the New York Factors' Lien Act changes the rule with respect to accounts
that come within its provisions, and requires notice filing for perfection. NEw YoRK PERS.
PRop. LAW § 45.
21 Rabinowitz v. People's Nat'l Bank, 235 Mass. 102, 126 N.E. 289 (1920). Illinois
(see In re Vardaman Shoe Co., 52 F. Supp. 562 (E.D. Mo. 1943)) and Indiana are also considered to have been Massachusetts rule states, although reported cases do not clearly
indicate that they were following this rule. See Conwill & Ellis, Much Ado About Nothing:
The Real Effect of Amended 60(a) on Accounts Receivable Financing, 64 HARv. L. REv.
62, 66 n.20 (1950).
22 The rule is stated in RESTATEmENT, CoNTAcTs § 173.

23 See In re Vardaman Shoe Co., 52 F. Supp. 562 (E.D. Mo. 1943).
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Parenthetically, it should be noted that the literal language of the act
invalidated trust receipts, as well as any other device that gives the trustee
a power of sale, entirely as security. Under this interpretation, since the
purchaser in ordinary course of business always takes free of the "entruster's"
lien, such an interest could never be perfected under the act. And in the one
decision directly in point, a district court in Virginia so applied the statute. 24
The Klauder case, with its implications for most kinds of inventory and
accounts financing, caused alarm among borrowers and lenders engaged in
accounts receivable financing. 25 It was followed by a wave of legislation
in most states defining when and how an assignment of accounts receivable
could be perfected. There is a complete lack of uniformity among the states,
but the statutes fall into three general categories: those providing for validation,
those providing for notice filing, and those providing for book marking.
The fourteen states with validation statutes 26 have, in effect, enacted
the American rule of non-notification. 27 They provide that an assignment is
valid either from its making, according to its terms, as of date or as of delivery.
It is obvious that the attendant lack of publicity fosters secret liens and that
it frustrated the policy of the Chandler Act. The notice filing statutes in twentynine jurisidictions, 28 including the Uniform Commercial Code states, 29 represent an attempt to compromise between the business desire for secrecy and
the public desire for notoriety. These statutes provide for some form of publicity such as filing with the appropriate public officer a notice of the assignment
designating the assignor and the assignee. But few of these statutes, with the
24

In re Harvey Distrib. Co., 88 F. Supp. 466 (E.D. Va. 1950).

25

See Conwill & Ellis, supra note 21, at 68.

26

See ARK.STAT. § 68-805 (1947); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 1801-1807 (Cum. Supp.
1958); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 121 , §§220-22 (1959); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 19-2102-19-2104
(Bums 1950); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 113, § 171 (1954); MD. ANN. CODE art. 8, § 1
(1957); MicH. Coi'. LAWS §§ 19.841-19.849 (1948); Mrmi. STAT. §§ 521.01-521.07 (1957);
N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 333 (1955); ORE. REv. STAT. ch. 80 (1953); R.I. GEN. LAWS
ANN. §§ 6-15-1-6-15-2 (1956); S.D. CODE §§ 51.0802-51.0803 (Supp. 1952); VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 11-5-11-7 (1950); Wis. STAT. § 241.28 (1957).
27 See text at note 20 supra.
28 See ALA. CODE tit. 39,

§§ 207-14

(1958); Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 44-801--44-808

(1956); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3017-29; COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 11, art. 2 (1953); FLA.
STAT. §§ 524.01-524.06 (1959); GA. CODE §§ 85-1806--85-1813 (1933); HAwAn REv. LAWS

ch. 187 (1955); IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 64-901-64-907 (1949); IOWA CODE §§ 539.7-539.15
(Cum. Supp. 1959); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-801-58-807 (1949); LA. REv. STAT.
§§ 9:3101-9:3110 (Supp. 1952); Mo. REv. STAT. ch. 410 (1949); NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 69-60169-621 (1943); NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 100.070-100.170 (1957); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 243.01243.10 (Cum. Supp. 1958); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§44-77-44-85 (1950); Omo REv. CODE
ANN. ch. 1325 (Baldwin 1959); OKLA. STAT. tit. 15, §§ 631-37 (1951); S.C. CODE, §§ 45-201
-45-211 (1952); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-1801-47-1804 (Cum. Supp. 1959); TEx. REv.
Civ. STAT. art. 260-1 (1948); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 9-3-1-9-3-6 (1953); WASH. REv. CODE
§ 63.16 (1957); Wyo. Comp'. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-272-34-287 (1945).
29 Kentucky, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania and West Virginia have adopted
the Uniform Commercial Code.
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30
exception of those based on the Code, exclude other methods of perfecting,
so that a person desiring information as to assignment of accounts cannot
rely solely on the fact that there is no notice on file as to a particular assignor.
If the assignee has chosen an alternate method of perfection, such as notice
to the account debtor, it will not be a matter of public record. In North
Dakota, a notation on the assignor's books of account, showing the fact
of the assignment, is sufficient. 31 There, notice will depend on the assignor's
willingness to permit inspection of his books. The metamorphosis of the state
law of perfection following the Chandler Act and the Klauder case leaves
32
twenty-nine notice filing states, 33
at present fourteen validation states,
34
one book marking state, two American rule jurisdictions,35 one English
rule jurisdiction, 36 and three uncertain.37
After state law had been thus transformed by commercial lending interests,
the 1950 amendment to Section 60 was enacted. 38 The bona fide purchaser
test was replaced with a lien-creditor test of perfection for all personal property transfers. By this amendment the trustee is deprived of the rights of a hypothetical bona fide purchaser, and a security interest is deemed perfected
when "no subsequent lien upon such property obtainable by legal or equitable
proceedings on a simple contract could become superior to the rights of the
39
transferee."
On its face, the change would seem to improve the value of security in
goods held for resale and in accounts receivable. However, the recent Seventh
Circuit decision in In re Crosstown Motors 4O indicates that certain trust receipt
transactions may still be invalidated. The court there applied a definition
of "new value" under the Bankruptcy Act which invalidated transfers
probably good under the definition of section 1 of the Uniform Trusts Receipts
Act. So far as accounts receivable are concerned, by the time the amendment
was passed most states had already prescribed methods of perfecting assignments which were independent of the distinction between a bona fide purchaser
3
0The Missouri and North Carolina statutes expressly authorize perfection either by
filing or notice to the account debtor. Mo. REv. STAT. § 410.020 (1949); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 44-80(1)(c) (Cum. Supp. 1949).
31N.D. REv. CODE § 9-1109 (Supp. 1957).
32
See note 26 supra.
33 See notes 28 & 29 supra.
34 See note 31 supra.
35 New Jersey and New York, except so far as New York law is modified by the Factor's
Lien Act. See note 20 supra.
36
Vermont. See note 19 supra.
37 New Mexico, Montana and Alaska.
38 64 Stat. 24 (1950), 11 U.S.C. § 60(a) (1958).
39 Ibid.
40 272 F.2d 224 (1959).
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and a creditor who could have obtained a superior lien by legal or equitable
proceedings. Only in Mississippi was the distinction still meaningful with
regard to the perfection of an assignment. Since the requirements for perfection still depend on state law, the effect of the amendment on accounts
4
receivable financing was negligible. 1

II. MULTISTATE PROBLEMS
Collectively, the various state statutes, together with the extant common
law rules, present complex mechanical difficulties to large concerns with
customers in many states who seek credit secured by liens on assigned accounts. There seems to be no sure way of predetermining what state law
governs a multistate transaction. 42 Nor is it clear which jurisdiction should
be the appropriate site of filing, if filing is required in any of the states involved.
Theoretically, there are at least six places to which courts might look
to find the proper law in determining the effectiveness of the assignment:
the place of assignment, the lender's domicile or place of business, the account
debtor's domicile or place of business, the borrower's domicile or place of
business, the place of performance of the account debtor's contract, or the place
ofperformance oftheborrower's contract. If one of the partieshas morethan one
place of business, the problem becomes even more complex. In fact, however,
many of these sites will be in the same jurisdiction. Characteristic of the problem situation is In re Rosen.43 In that case the assignor, a resident of New
Jersey, and the assignee, a resident of Pennsylvania, agreed to terms on which
credit was to be extended in a contract which provided that Pennsylvania
law should govern the transaction. The assignor and his customers, the account debtors, did business in New Jersey. Accounts were payable at the
assignor's place of business, and the assignor then deposited the money in
a New Jersey bank for the assignee. On these facts, Judge Goodrich, a recognized authority on conflict of laws, held that, despite the efforts of the parties
to stipulate the controlling law, New Jersey law applied. He based his decision
on "the usual conflict of laws rule, that the law of the place of assignment
controls."44 There is some additional authority to the effect that the place
of assignment controls 45 but other cases hold that the borrower's domicile
41 Conwill & Ellis, supra note 21, at 78.
42 This problem was recognized by the Supreme Court as a possible result of its decision
in the Klauder case: "So also is it true that conflicts and confusion may result where the

transaction or location of the parties is of such a nature that doubt arises as to which of
different state laws is applicable. But the fact that the remedy may fall short in these respects

does not justify denying it all effect." Corn Exch. Nat'l Bank v. Klauder, 318 U.S.
434, 441 (1943).
43 157 F.2d 997 (3rd Cir. 1946), affirming 66 F. Supp. 174 (1946).
44 Id. at 999.
45 See Monarch Discount Co. v. Chesapeake & O.R.R., 285 11.233,120 N.E. 743 (1918);
Couret v. Connor, 118 Miss. 374, 79 So. 230 (1918); Appeal of Colburn, 74 Conn. 463,
51 At. 139 (1902).
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46

is decisive. It should be noted that both these sites were in New Jersey
in the Rosen case. As one writer put it, "there is no definite and authoritative
47
answer, the choice is between general rules of thumb or not operating at all."
A bank officer who appeared as a witness before a House subcommittee
hearing on the proposed amendment of 60(a) of the Bankruptcy Act testified
that the "situation had come to such a pass that his institution was compelled
to regard all such types of transactions as unsecured loans and to rule on them
...accordingly." 48 State legislation protecting bona fide purchasers and lien
and general creditors by notice filing, followed by new strategies of borrowers
and lenders, has resulted in complex conflict of laws problems, creating a
"confusing legal mosaic, rather than a unified picture." 49 Meanwhile, the laws
have neither made accounts receivable financing safe for the lenders nor provided adequate protection for the interests of general creditors in bankruptcy.
It has been suggested that a uniform law, such as the notice filing provisions
of the Uniform Commerical Code may be the answer to the problem of
determining what state law governs a multistate transaction.5 0 The Code
provides a solution to the conflict of laws problem in section 9-103 (1).
Under this section, if the office where the assignor of accounts or contract
rights keeps his records concerning them is in the Code State, the validity
and perfection of the security interest is governed by the Code; otherwise
it is determined by the law (including the conflict of laws rules) of the jurisdiction where such office is located. When the assignor keeps his records in
more than one state, the assignee, to be perfectly safe, can file in all such
states.5 1 However, until the Code is in force in all of the major commercial
states there will still be conflicts problems.

III.

BENEIcT V. RATNER

Concern about secret assignments of accounts receivable is also reflected
in the doctrine of Benedict v. Ratner,5 2 which conclusively imputed fraud
of creditors to transactions in which the assignor retained full dominion
over the proceeds from collection of accounts. Even when the assignor turns
46
Union Trust Co. v. Bulkeley, 150 Fed. 510 (6th Cir. 1907); Woodward v. Brooks,
128 Il. 222, 20 N.E. 685 (1889).
47 Malcolm, Conflicts of Lmv-Accounts Receivable, 30 MAss. L.Q. 38, 40 (1945).
48 SEN.REP. No. 72, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1949).
49 Koessler, New Legislation Affecting Non-notificationFinancingof Accounts Receivable,

44 MICH. L. REv. 563, 604 (1946).
5

0Comment, Multistate Accounts Receivable Financing: Conflicts in Context, 67 YALE

L.J. 412, 415 (1958).
51

See UNiFoRM COMMERCIAL CODE § 9-103, comment. A similar test is found in RE-

STATEmNT (SECOND), CONFLIcT OF LAWS § 354 (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1960): "in the case of

accounts receivable of a business enterprise, questions of priority are determined by the
local law of the state where the books evidencing the accounts are kept."
52 268 U.S. 353 (1924).
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over the proceeds immediately to the assignee, the practice of indirect collection by the assignor has proved to have great susceptibility to fraud. Although
the bulk of accounts receivable financing is part of the normal credit pattern,
when credit sellers who are on their last legs financially indulge in receivables
financing, the lending institution frequently finds fake receivables or receivables the collection of which has not been accounted for.5 3
In Benedict, an assignment of existing and future accounts as security
for a loan authorized the assignor to collect the accounts, but did not require
him to account to the assignee for proceeds until demand was made. The
Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Brandeis, held that under New York
law the assignment was void as against creditors because there was no
requirement of an accounting for proceeds. The "dominion" rule emanating
from that case provides that a lien on receivables is invalid if the lender permits
the borrower to exert unfettered dominion over the cash proceeds. In the
Second Circuit that rule has been broadened by taking the negative inference
to mean that the creditor loses his lien unless he exerts complete dominion
over the proceeds, leaving no dominion to the borrower. 54 In that important
circuit, the legal hazards surrounding accounts receivable financing are therefore particularly great. In Lee v. State Bank and Trust Co.55 the assignee
of accounts lost his lien on the accounts because the assignor had power to
deal with returned goods. If the lender, having failed to police his loan,
nevertheless receives some payments of proceeds, he may find that such
payments, if received within four months of bankruptcy, constitute a preference and therefore are recoverable by the trustee in bankruptcy. 56
The dominion rule of Benedict v. Ratner is, however, by no means universally applied. Many state statutes have avoided it, and the Uniform Commercial Code, in section 9-205, has rejected the doctrine of dominion by stating
that the assignor can freely use the proceeds as they are collected. 57 His
failure to account for proceeds immediately will not jeopardize the assignee's
security interest under this section. The Benedict rule has been considerably
relaxed in the Fifth Circuit in contrast to its strict application in the Second
Circuit. In Lindsay v. RickenbackerS8 the assignee was to deposit collections
53

Kripke, Address, supranote 6.

4

5 1bid. See also Brown v. Leo, 12 F.2d 350 (2d Cir. 1926); Lee v. State Bank & Trust
Co., 54 F.2d 518 (2d Cir. 1931).
55 54 F.2d 518 (2d Cir. 1931).
56 Dunham, Inventory and Accounts Receivable Financing, 62 HARv. L. REV. 588, 593
(1949).
57
See Comment, supra note 50. But see In the Matter of the New Haven Clock and
Watch Co., 253 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1958), where it was argued, unsuccessfully, that Benedict
v. Ratner was a national rule. If this argument were accepted and upheld by the Supreme
Court, state variatons of the Benedict rule would be nullified.
58 116 F.2d 29 (5th Cir. 1940).
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in a special account for the assignor and hold them until demand for payment
was made. The assignee later gave the assignor a power of attorney to draw
on the special account for money to be used in the assignor's business, with
the understanding that no withdrawals should be made until accounts of
substantially the same amount were assigned to the assignee. The court
held that a valid lien existed and that Benedict was not applicable to these
facts, although there is little doubt that the case would have been decided
otherwise in the Second Circuit. A later Fifth Circuit decision, Second
Nat'l Bank v. Phillips,59 suggests that the Texas filing statute, by removing
the vice of secrecy, reduces the importance of adherence to Benedict.
Thus a conflict in policy similar to that in the state legislation relating
to accounts receivable can be discerned in the application of the dominion
rule. In the Fifth Circuit, the courts seem more concerned with the protection
of the lender; in the Second Circuit with the general creditor. Similarly, some
statutes promote secrecy while others favor notoriety. The interplay between
the dominion rule and the statutes, as indicated in Second Nat'l Bank v.
Phillips, raises new questions. What should be the effect of a notice filing
statute on the dominion rule ? If there is a validation statute in the jurisdiction,
does the dominion rule become more important because of the secrecy
involved? The Fifth Circuit, at least, seems to feel that the dominion rule
can be dispensed with so long as there is notice that accounts receivable
financing is being undertaken. 60
IV.

CONCLUSION

The foregoing survey of the law governing accounts receivable financing
illustrates that attempts to protect lending interests by validation statutes,
and general creditors by notice filing statutes, have resulted in a chaotic
body of law which gives adequate protection to neither. The lender, even
in a validation state, faces a double risk: that of the dominion rule of Benedict
v. Ratner, and that of a conflict of laws problem in a multistate transaction. 61
On the other hand, amended section 60(a) of the Bankruptcy Act and the
state validation statutes present a serious problem of fairness among creditors
in bankruptcy. Unless it is possible to work out a system of notice filing by
which lenders and general creditors can protect themselves, it would seem
that ultimately a choice must be made protecting one or the other.
It is submitted that business reasons for secrecy are not compelling enough
to justify equitable liens in bankruptcy based upon assignments of accounts
receivable. Furthermore, secrecy may be self-defeating since the lender takes
59 189 F.2d 115, 118 (5th Cir. 1951).
60

Second Nat'l Bank v. Phillips, supra note 59.
See Comment, 67 YALE L.J. 847, 892 (1958), where the author, after asserting that
contract rights should be readily available as a source of security, warns that "whatever
the jurisdiction, care must be taken to conform to the manifold technical requirements,
necessary for a valid creation and maintenance of a secured interest."
61
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the risk of the borrower's dishonesty in case there is a prior lien. It has been
argued that such liens can be justified on the ground that the estate of the
bankrupt has been enriched by a credit advance on its book accounts. It is,
however, clear that general creditors too have enriched the estate. They
may even have been actively misled if they advanced credit, relying upon a
profitable future contract, only to find the debtor had assigned the money to
become due under it.62 Since a valid secured interest in the property of the
bankrupt is no part of the bankrupt estate, it outranks even the wage earner's
priorities which are among those entitled to be paid first out of the estate.
Thus, under an equitable lien theory, the holder of an unpublicized assignment
of accounts would be entitled to come in ahead of wage earners, and of unsecured creditors who may have relied on the debtor's future assets.
Legislative efforts to resolve the conflicting interests of lenders and general
creditors have been described in the progression from the Chandler Act,
which attempted to wipe out secret liens entirely; to validation statutes
which made the Chandler Act ineffective; and notice filing statutes which effected a compromise. When the lending interests finally obtained an amendment to the Chandler Act, a majority of the states had declared for notice.
Attempts by the states to deal with the problem themselves have resulted
not in a single rule but in new problems arising out of a conflict of rules.
At present, neither the lender nor the general creditor is adequately protected,
and there is a hopeless lack of uniformity in the law governing assignment
of accounts.
These problems are not confined to accounts receivable financing. It is
clear that a lender is secured only to the extent that his interest is "perfected."
This being true, the safety of any security device in the bankruptcy situation
may be questionable. State law by itself cannot adequately cope with either
of the fundamental elements of security-conferring a priority position upon
a particular creditor, and giving notice to competing creditors. State law
is inadequate not only because of conflicts problems, but also because of the
fact that an amendment to the Bankruptcy Act could always wipe out whatever tests of perfection the states had devised.
The solution, once a policy is chosen, would seem to lie in a uniform
law of national scope. It has been suggested that Congress under the commerce
clause has the power to enact uniform commercial rules. 63 At any rate,
Congress can do much through its power to settle all bankruptcies by a uni62

See Sharp, Book Review, 61 YALE L.J. 1119, 1130 (1950).
63 Koessler, supra note 49, at 614. In the light of the present Supreme Court trend
toward interpreting the concept of "affecting interstate commerce" broadly (see Wickard
v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948)), it would
seem that the movement of chattel paper from retailer to financial institutions with offices
in every principal city in the country could be regarded as interstate commerce. See also the
work of Professor Crosskey which suggests that the commerce clause was never intended
to have an interstate limitation. 1 CRossK-Y, POLrICS AND THE CONSTITUTION (1950).
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form federal law.6 4 It could provide a uniform test of perfection and could
settle multistate conflicts of law. 65 The choice of a test will depend on the
attitude taken toward secured lending, which in turn depends upon ajudgment
about the effect of a severe economic downturn on our credit economy.
The adoption of notice filing provisions such as those of the Uniform Commercial Code would appear to merit serious consideration. In making a judgment
as to the extent to which secured lending should be protected, the great
amount of credit extended on all of the security devices cannot be ignored.
Since the last depression, accounts receivable have moved from last ditch
to normal financing. With this great reliance on secured lending, a rash
of bankruptcies could snowball into an economic crisis. In such a situation
the faults of our present system of security devices, resulting from reliance upon
encumbered assets and from inequalities among creditors, would appear too
late.
64 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8: "The Congress shall have Power... to establish... Uniform
Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States."
65 Koessler, supra note 49, at 614.

COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL IN CRIMINAL CASES
Ajudgment settles certain issues between the parties to an action. The issues
so settled are those which must have been settled in order to reach the judgment. According to the doctrine of collateral estoppel, such issues are conclusively determined and cannot be raised again in a different action between
the same parties.' The doctrine of collateral estoppel has received most attention in civil cases. Various courts, including the United States Supreme Court,
2
have, however, stated that the doctrine applies also to criminal cases.
3
The recent case of Hoag v. New Jersey furnishes a classic example of the
kind of criminal case in which the doctrine of collateral estoppel may become
important. 4 In this respect, Hoag sets the stage for a discussion of the prob-

ICommissioner v.

Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591 (1948); United States v. Moser, 266 U.S. 236

(1924); Crowell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351 (1876); see RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS § 45,

comment c (1942).
2 Sealfon v. United States, 332 U.S. 575 (1948); United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S.
85 (1916); United States v. Kenny, 236 F.2d 128 (3d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 894
(1956); Cosgrove v. United States, 224 F.2d 146 (9th Cir. 1954); Harris v. State, 193 Ga.
109, 17 S.E.2d 728 (1941); State v. Erwin, 101 Utah 365, 120 P.2d 285 (1941); State v.
Heaton, 56 N.D. 357, 217 N.W. 531 (1927).
3 356 U.S. 464 (1958), affirming 21 N.J. 496, 122 A.2d 628 (1956).
4 There are at least two types of situations in which participation in a given transaction
may bring prosecution for more than one crime and more than one trial. In the first type,
represented by Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958), the perpetration of the same act
against two or more people at the same time violates the same criminal statute several times.
The second type is represented by the case where a given transaction violates two different

